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In recent years, academic scholarship on Rwanda has increased dramatically. The vast majority 
has focused on the challenges that Rwanda faces in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, during 
which an estimated 800,000 civilians—most of whom were members of the nation’s ethnic 
Tutsi minority community—were murdered by extremists affiliated with the nation’s ethnic 
Hutu majority. Particular interest has centred on the government’s varied approach to 
transitional justice aimed at recognizing and addressing the harms endured by the Tutsi 
minority during the genocide. The government has pursued what former Prosecutor General of 
Rwanda, Gerald Gahima, characterized as “universal accountability,” using a complex blend 
of national courts and gacaca—a reinvented dispute resolution mechanism that originated as a 
means of restoring social harmony following community-based conflicts with the Nyiginya 
Kingdom that ruled Rwanda from the sixteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. Rwanda has 
pursued legal accountability on an unprecedented scale compared to other genocides in which 
prosecutors have tried only a select few high-level officials deemed to have had the greatest 
criminal responsibility for atrocities. 
 
Among Rwanda’s diverse array of post-genocide transitional justice mechanisms, the gacaca 
courts that operated across the country from 2005 to 2012 have arguably captured most interest 
of scholars, transitional justice practitioners, and the public alike. Remediation in Rwanda: 
Grassroots Legal Forums by Kristin Doughty and Inside Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Seeking 
Justice After Genocide by Bert Ingelaere are refreshing additions to a topic that has otherwise 
felt exhausted in recent years. Both books are based on long-term immersion in Rwanda 
involving direct engagement with Rwandans who have been actively involved in gacaca and, 
in Doughty’s case related grassroots legal forums as well, as bystanders, accused génocidaires, 
survivors, witnesses, and judges. This immersion allows Doughty and Ingelaere to offer 
valuable insights into the daily practices of gacaca and its ability to accomplish five core goals: 
establishing the truth of what happened during the genocide; pursuing accelerated legal 
accountability for the vast numbers of Rwandans who were accused of genocide-related 
crimes; eradicating a perceived culture of impunity where atrocities against Tutsi were 
concerned; supporting national unity and reconciliation; and administering justice using a 
uniquely Rwandan form of dispute resolution with which Rwandans would be familiar, 
increasing the likelihood of their support for the trials. 
 
Ingelaere’s Inside Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts begins by highlighting gacaca as a “traditional” 
institution adapted by the post-genocide ruling party—the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—
with the intention of facilitating restorative justice by promoting “truth-telling” among the 
general public. He provides a brief historical overview of gacaca’s evolution from its use to 
address small-scale interpersonal conflicts in the pre-colonial period, to the RPF’s decision in 
1999 to experiment with gacaca, before putting it into practice across the country in 2005. 
Shortly after its nation-wide launch, however, Ingelaere finds that the RPF altered gacaca’s 
intended goals, and instead used it to pursue retributive justice. While gacaca was supposed to 
centre on the confessions of people who had committed crimes during the genocide—ranging 
from looting the homes of murdered or fled Tutsi, to torturing and murdering of their Tutsi 
compatriots—Ingelaere notes that in practice, trials relied on accusations, whereby “a 
significant number of the defendants on trial were accused, pleaded not guilty, and were 
convicted” (5). Furthermore, he finds that public participation rates in gacaca were surprisingly 
low compared to the mass participation that the RPF and international supporters envisioned, 
averaging at 2.2 percent of the nation’s overall population (66). Ingelaere grounds these 
observations in an impressive range of data acquired over three years of intensive fieldwork, 
including ethnographic immersion, life history interviews, focus-group discussions, and 
observation of over 2000 trials spread across seven sectors—the underlying qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies for which are carefully outlined in his second chapter, “Learning 
‘to be Kinyarwanda.’”  
 
Ingelaere ultimately concludes that gacaca’s shift from its initial restorative goals to its 
retributive reality lies in the courts’ importance for shoring up the, at times, fragile legitimacy 
of the RPF, as well as the strategic interests of Rwanda’s rural majority, who used the trials to 
resolve a range of interpersonal conflicts by making false allegations, among other tactics. 
Regarding gacaca’s increased politicization by the RPF, Ingelaere notes that the RPF used 
gacaca to maintain centralized control by monitoring citizens through a “dense web of 
administrative structures, a semihidden network of intelligence agents, and continuous 
reeducation and sensitization activities.” Most Rwandans—anticipating constant state 
surveillance—monitored themselves and each other to uphold rehearsed consensus with 
government policies (115). Further complicating matters, Ingelaere emphasizes the lay judges’ 
tendency to systematically exclude “all crimes under investigation that could not be qualified 
as acts of genocide against the Tutsi population,” even though gacaca’s foundational laws 
allowed for consideration of criminal acts that occurred during Rwanda’s civil war (1990-1994) 
and genocide regardless of the victim’s ethnicity (69). Crucially, lay judges had the ability to 
consider crimes perpetrated by the predominately Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Army—the RPF’s 
military arm—among other atrocities that targeted Hutu and Twa civilians, but failed to do so. 
Ingelaere argues that this privileging of truth about Tutsi suffering during the genocide, 
combined with people’s firsthand observations of “the absence of truth, the practice of lying, 
or of giving false testimony” left many Rwandans with a complicated, but predominantly 
negative understanding of the trials’ restorative potential (95). 
 
Doughty’s Remediation in Rwanda similarly offers important insights for transitional justice 
practices in Rwanda, using ethnographic methods to explore how civilians “negotiated moral 
community and imagined alternative futures” (1). She does so by amplifying the debates that 
occurred surrounding not just gacaca, but two lesser researched grassroots legal forums that 
mediate disputes between Rwandans—the comite y’abunzi (mediation committees) and legal 
aid clinics—that work in tandem with gacaca to help Rwandans achieve reconciliation 
following the genocide. Her insights are supported by data acquired over eighteen months of 
ethnographic fieldwork that involved attendance at fifty-six gacaca sessions, fourteen 
mediation committee sessions, and twelve legal aid clinic sessions, as well as broader 
participant observation and interviews with government officials, NGO employees, and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda staff. Following a valuable historical overview 
that details the production of history under different Rwandan governments dating from 
Nyiginya Kingdom to the RPF’s post-genocide official narrative, Doughty analyses how 
Rwandans manoeuvred within different mediation practices in the post-genocide period. She 
starts by outlining the RPF’s preferred official narrative and then considers how this narrative 
was institutionalized in grassroots law by drawing on conciliation-based systems that had long 
historical roots in Rwanda—gacaca and the comite y’abunzi—which the RPF, much like its 
monarchical predecessors, used in tandem with Western-style criminal trials to reinforce state 
control over citizenry.  
 
Doughty’s findings regarding gacaca align nicely with Ingelaere’s, highlighting the rich 
conversations that emerged during trials alongside people’s concerns regarding state 
interference and surveillance, and the overarching sense that “as important as what people said 
before gacaca was what they did not say (107). But her greatest contribution arguably lies in 
her ability to bring gacaca into conversation with the day-to-day functionings of the comite 
y’abunzi and a legal aid clinic to provide a more comprehensive overview of the various options 
that Rwandans can use to settle disputes including, but not limited to, the genocide.  
 
Established in 2004 to mediate low-level civil and criminal cases, valued at less than three 
million Rwandan francs (~3,500 USD), among families and neighbours, the comite y’abunzi 
has become a primary mechanism for negotiating rural land disputes resulting from mass 
movements of people and other events associated with the civil war and genocide, as well as 
important post-genocide policy changes, such as granting women the rights to own and inherit 
land for the first time since Rwanda’s independence in 1962. While there is evidence to suggest 
that people typically accepted the comite y’abunzi’s rulings as less punitive compared to 
gacaca, Doughty argues that participants often found the process or outcomes unsatisfactory, 
revealing tensions within families and other intimates alongside the more commonly studied 
anxieties that persist across ethnic and political lines and with the authoritarian state in post-
genocide Rwanda.  
 
Doughty next turns her analysis to a novel legal initiative—the legal aid clinic that was 
launched by the National University of Rwanda in 2001—to provide legal advice to rural 
Rwandans surrounding a range of interpersonal conflicts, including conflicts that had already 
been mediated unsatisfactorily by gacaca or the comite y’abunzi. Because of its relative 
novelty, however, legal clinic participants often struggled to make sense of the staff’s focus on 
securing documentary rather than testimonial evidence in support of people’s claims, among 
other legal requirements, and likewise assumed that the clinic exercised state power, even 
though in reality its staff had no authority to enforce their recommended settlements.  
 
Taken together, these new publications by Doughty and Ingelaere represent important 
contributions to the literature on transitional justice in and beyond Rwanda. Both authors 
actively engage with the history and politics that inform the production of knowledge about 
gacaca and related grassroots legal forums in post-genocide Rwanda. Beyond Rwanda, they 
highlight the complicated negotiations that are often involved in reinventing “traditions” to 
achieve modern transitional justice goals, and the, at times, unreasonable expectations that 
transitional justice practitioners and participants can have about these initiatives’ ability to 
promote individual healing, social repair, and a sense of shared justice. These works speak to 
a broader foundational question for the field of transitional justice regarding whether it is ever 
possible to achieve such lofty restorative goals in the aftermath of genocide given the processes 
aimed at facilitating reconciliation are often themselves—as Doughty phrases it—“inherently 
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